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AN ITEM VETO: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND
POLITICAL IRRELEVANCY
L. PETER SCHULTZ*
The practice of loading the budget with unnecessary spend-
ing-and then waiting until the eleventh hour to pass a
Continuing Resolution on the assumption that it was safe
from a Presidential veto-has gone on much too long. It is
one of the principal reasons why the growth of Government
spending is still not under control. Ronald Reagan'
No doubt many Americans share the image created by
the President's words quoted above. The quotation reflects
the idea that because Congress knowingly appropriates
money unnecessarily, it sometimes uses underhanded or devi-
ous means to work its will against the wishes of the people or
at least against those of the President, and certainly against
any sound fiscal judgment. This image is quite believable and
in its own way is even comforting: believable because Con-
gress has long been criticized for its alleged propensity to
spend2 ; comforting because the image suggests that congres-
sional spending, like other illegitimate practices, only thrives
in a closet, and if brought out in the open or if an additional
check were placed on Congress, all would be well. Under the
public eye or under the control of a powerful and public-spir-
ited overseer, the sin of congressional spending would wither
or at least be reduced from a mortal sin to one of venial
proportions.
Given this common perception of congressional spending
practices, bulging budgets and deepening deficits, a line item
veto, which would allow the President to veto particular
items in appropriations bills, looks particularly appealing.
Some think such a provision would allow the President to dis-
cipline Congress by revealing and excising congressional ap-
* Assistant Professor of Politics, Catholic University of America,
Washington, D.C.
1. President Ronald Reagan, Remarks to Reporters Announcing the
Veto of H.J. Res. 357, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1299 (Nov. 23, 1981).
2. See generally Palffy, Giving the Budget Process Teeth, 305 HERITAGE
FOUND. BACKGROUNDER (1983).
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propriations excesses.3 Its supporters offer two rationales for
the line item veto. Some argue that with such a provision the
President would be able to cut deeply into Congress' practice
of spending to satisfy interests "back home," thus allowing
for a degree of budgetary control and fiscal responsibility not
achievable under the current constitutional arrangements." A
line item veto is presented as the change necessary to enable
the government to put its fiscal affairs in order and, ulti-
mately at least, to balance the budget.5 Others argue that
even if a line item veto provision is not sufficient of itself to
ensure a balanced budget, it is nonetheless a useful tool in
reforming the budget process and reducing unnecessary ex-
pense.' Thus, from either perspective, a line item veto provi-
sion seems necessary and beneficial.
Before amending the Constitution, we should carefully
scrutinize the proposed amendments. In this case, such scru-
tiny is especially necessary given the degree of public concern
over current budgetary problems. First, we must ask
whether and to what degree a line item veto addresses the
causes of the current deficits. Whether a line item veto will
allow or promote to any great extent a balanced budget de-
pends upon the source(s) of the deficits, and upon whether
those deficits can be charged to congressional profligacy. Sec-
3. Hearings on An Item Veto Constitutional Amendment Before the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1984) (testimony of Sen. Dixon)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings].
4. Id. at 11-13. See also Palffy, Line Item Veto: Trimming the Pork, 343
HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER 5 (1984).
5. Hearings, supra note 3, at 8. See also Wall St. J., Sept. 22, 1983, at
30, col. 1, where it is asserted that the budget processes in many states
"work . . . where the governor has line-item veto power," while the fed-
eral process is "about as whacky as something out of the 'Dukes of
Hazzard'."
6. A line-item veto would be no fiscal panacea. It does not even
address the primary federal spending problem - the spiraling
growth of entitlements. Nor would it deal with many of the seri-
ous shortcomings of the congressional budget process. But by tak-
ing the handcuffs off the President in the appropriations process,
the line-item veto would constitute an important first step toward
fiscal responsibility.
Palffy, Line-Item Veto: Trimming the Pork, supra, note 4 at 10.
7. As is well known, concern over current budget deficits is wide-
spread, comprehending both conservatives and liberals. Walter Mondale,
e.g., pinned his campaign against President Reagan on his plan to balance
the budget in the near future. This concern is also reflected by scholarly
works on the federal budget and that process. Compare D. IPPOLITO, CON-
GRESSIONAL SPENDING (1981), with H. SHUMAN, POLITICS AND THE BUDGET:
THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS (1984).
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ond, we ask what effect such an amendment would have on
the constitutional relationship between the President and
Congress, and whether these effects would be "politically"
unhealthy. Finally, it is worthwhile to ask whether the un-
amended Constitution provides any alternatives with the ad-
vantages of a line item veto, but without the deleterious side-
effects. We turn first to the alleged fiscal irresponsibility of
Congress and whether a line item veto would offset this al-
leged profligacy.
II
Source proponents of the line item veto have argued that
Congress' fiscal irresponsibility causes the budgetary
problems. 8 Under this analysis, congressional irresponsibility
can be traced to the Constitution itself, specifically to the sep-
aration of powers between two distinct and independent de-
partments of government. 9 This separation prevents effective
executive oversight and allows Congress to have its way re-
garding appropriations. Although the President possesses
the veto power, Congress may appropriate non-essential
items into useful legislation. Such appropriations force the
President to veto an entire bill to nullify the non-essential, or
to accept the non-essential for the sake of the essential. Most
often the President signs the bill despite its objectionable
items."1 This analysis suggests that Congress has the Presi-
dent at a disadvantage with regard to appropriations, and this
disadvantage can be traced directly to the separation of pow-
ers. Hence, it is necessary to modify the separation of powers
to solve the problem of fiscal irresponsibility. 2
8. Hearings, supra note 3, at 2 (testimony of Sen. Hatch).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, §1 provides: "All legislative powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress .... " art. I, §8 defines Congress'
spending and taxing power. The executive power is described in U.S.
CONST. art. II.
10. Executive oversight of Congressional spending is authorized in
U.S. CONsT. art. I, §7, cl. 2 which provides:Every Bill which shall have
passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it be-
comes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he
approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his objections to
that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections
at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.
11. Hearings, supra note 3, at 2-3 (testimony of Sen. Hatch).
12. [U]nder current law, the President must approve or disap-
prove entire appropriations bills, [so] Congress is able to pass spe-
cial interest and non-germane "riders" by incorporating them into
major last-minute funding bills and resolutions. If the President
19851
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This institutional analysis of the budget problem is not
new. The idea dates back at least to the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century when the "progressives" and others
began a somewhat concerted critique of the Constitution.1"
One version of this critique held that the Constitution was an
eighteenth century document, unsuitable by and large for the
twentieth century because more government and less individ-
ual freedom was needed to assure that economic and social
progress was widely shared. "More government" meant more
trust of government and, therewith, a different kind of gov-
ernmental arrangement than that embodied in the Constitu-
tion of 1787. The nation could no longer afford a govern-
ment incapable of forming and implementing great plans.
The nation was no longer suited to a government of sepa-
rated powers, because such an arrangement rendered the
government incapable of governing efficiently. The progres-
sive critique of "pork barrel" legislation, Congress' alleged
propensity to spend extravagant sums of money on non-es-
sential programs, is part and parcel of the broad progressive
critique of the separation of powers and, by implication, of
the Constitution itself."4 Until the separation of powers is
modified, giving the President more control over appropria-
tions, fiscal irresponsibility in the form of congressional ex-
travagance is "systemic." Constitutional change is mandatory
given this understanding of the "budget problem."15
Although still accepted by some, the progressive critique
of the constitutional order raises several questions: Is it accu-
rate to argue that Congress can no more resist spending than
refuses to sign such "Christmas tree" bills, he often must shut
down the government agencies covered by the legislation. Palffy,
Line-Item Veto: Trimming the Pork, supra note 4 at 2.
"Increasingly, a President has the choice of either shutting down the
government, or signing into law billions of dollars in spending he or she
does not support." Hearings, supra note 3 at 3 (testimony of Sen. Dixon).
13. See, e.g., C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913).
14. See generally, R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM, 173-213
(1959); THE PROGRESSIVE ERA: LIBERAL RENAISSANCE OR LIBERAL FAILURE?
(A. Mann ed. 1963).
15. Although this institutional argument has a long history, it came
into its own in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with the
rise of "progressivism." One of the best and certainly one of the most illu-
minating statements of progressivism is H. CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERI-
CAN LIFE (1909). For a critique of the progressives, at least with regard to
their thoughts on the presidency, see J. CEASER, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION:
THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT (1979).
[Vol. I
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an alcoholic can resist a drink? The progressive critique of
the constitutional order suggests an affirmative answer. 16 The
longstanding conception of Congress as spendthrift seems to
support this view. 7 To test Whether this conception is accu-
rate, it is worth asking whether and to what degree Congress
is profligate. At least one observer has suggested that the in-
stitutional arrangements under the Constitution discourage
spending:
The [national political] system is one of checks and bal
ances, and the Federal machinery for combatting and de-
flating departmental concepts of what is necessary is so ex-
tensive and at times so difficult of persuasion that unless
departmental representatives proceed to present their view-
point in a vigorous and tenacious manner, objectives which
are essential . . . to the public welfare might . . . be sub-
merged by some purely budgetary objective, or by the
budgetary power, rather than served thereby. At this point
the departmental budget officer proceeds on the principle
that the government exists to serve the needs of a great
people and not primarily for the purpose of creating a
model budget system. 8
Note the degree to which congressional committees are
said to concern themselves with questions of economy or with
purely budgetary questions. Rather than questioning whether
the spending is necessary, most often the question asked is
whether the proposed spending is within budgetary guide-
lines.' According to those who suggest that institutional ar-
rangements under the Constitution discourage spending, the
effect of the system of "checks and balances" or the separa-
tion of powers is to deflate appropriations legislation. The
result is not surprising. One purpose of "checking and bal-
ancing" is to allow one office to check the operations of an-
16. Besides the better known and more general "Progressive" writ-
ings, such as H. CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE (1971) and W. WIL-
SON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1981),
one should consult also W. TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS
(1925) for a critique of Congress based on its alleged inability to curb
spending.
17. See, e.g., Palffy, supra note 2.
18. Jump, Budgetary and Financial Administration in an Operating De-
partment of the Federal Government, 5, quoted in A. WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS
OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS, 18-19 (3d ed. 1979).
19. A. WILDAVSKY, BUDGETING: A COMPARATIVE THEORY OF BUDGETARY
PROCESS 24-25 (1975).
20. Id. at 25
19851
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other with an eye to preventing unnecessary expenditures. It
is not too surprising that congressional committees often cast
themselves in the role of overseers who are concerned with
rooting out extravagance and waste.21 Administrators are
constantly requesting more money than they need, because
they know that Congress will rarely meet their initial requests
however reasonable they might appear to be."
Along similar lines, it is worth pointing out that COLA
provisions (Cost of Living Adjustments) were adopted by
Congress in part because they represented a way to meet en-
hanced economic requirements without having to negotiate
through the various checks and balances that exist in the leg-
islative process.23 Congress' attempt to find a way of raising
the salaries of Congressmen without negotiating through the
normal legislative process24 suggests that Congress finds it
very difficult to spend money, even for legitimate purposes.
In sum, it is questionable whether the institutional arrange-
ments under the Constitution inflate or deflate appropria-
tions legislation.
If the current deficits can not to be explained in institu-
tional terms, how can they to be explained? Perhaps these
deficits reflect more a political than an institutional problem.
Rather than charging the current deficits to the Constitution
generally, and to the separation of powers specifically, per-
haps they should be charged to politics - to what public
opinion and the prevailing "establishment" wisdom deem es-
sential to the public good. The nation may have made certain
public policy choices and have chosen to pursue a course of
public conduct even though it is, to say the least, expensive.
The "welfare state," as domestic policy has been called at
least since the 1960's, is an expensive system to build and to
maintain if it is to meet the needs of the disadvantaged
Americans.25 Despite this expense, however, evidence indi-
21. Id.
22. See Ornstein, The Misers of Capitol Hill, The Washington Post,
Jan. 29, 1984, at DI, col..
23. Cost of living adjustments for Social Security benefits are trig-
gered by changes in the Consumer Price Index, as Computed by the Dep't.
of Labor. 42 U.S.C. §415(i) (1982).
24. See the very able report entitled, "Constitutional Commission to
Set the Compensation of Members of Congress," Report of the Committee
on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 1984.
25. It is peculiary American perhaps that the great expense involved
in establishing and maintaining a welfare state has to be argued and
demonstrated. Although this should have been clear from the outset, and
may have been in some minds, one gets the impression from the current
[Vol. I
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cates that Americans continue to support the government's
effort to meet the needs of those who are either temporarily
or permanently disadvantaged." Thus, politicians seek ways
to minimize, reduce or control the costs of the welfare state,
one of the most common ways being proposals for some kind
of decentralization.1
7
The widely perceived need to "modernize" the nation's
defense system to offset growing obsolescence and the Soviet
build-up of forces complicates these attempts to control the
costs of domestic policy. The nation is discovering that an ad-
equate national security system is also an expensive proposi-
tion. Various alternative policies including a nuclear freeze
have been suggested in order to control or reduce the cost of
national defense, but, for the near future at least, it seems
necessary and beneficial on both the domestic and foreign
fronts to spend a great deal of money to guarantee a decent
life to all deserving Americans, and to ensure that the nation
is as secure as possible from its foreign enemies.
When one examines the budget and the programs which
have done the most to "bust the budget," it becomes clear
political debate that this expense represents a failure of the political system
generally and of the budgetary system specifically. Consider, for example,
the argument of the Grace Commission that by using different methods this
great expense can be controlled, even eliminated. The Report of the Grace
Commission (1984).
26. As typically reported, "payments for individuals," the largest part
of "non-defense" spending, account for the huge growth in the federal
budget outlays between 1952 and 1980, rising from under $300 billion to
about $750 billion (in constant 1982 dollars). But this growth was hardly
accidental or unintended, with the most visible "turning point" being 1965
and the advent of the "Great Society." See D. IPPOLITO, CONGRESSIONAL
SPENDING 27 (1981). As has been recognized by almost everyone, there has
been a change in priorities over the past twenty-five years from defense
spending to social welfare spending. And it would be more than a little
misleading to suggest that this change "just happened," i.e., was either un-
planned or unnoticed. Therefore, it is also more than a little misleading to
suggest that different institutional arrangements would have offset the al-
leged fiscal excesses which have resulted. Indeed, as indicated immediately
above, one can argue that the institutional arrangements in existence have
hindered fiscal excesses.
27. All of the last four Presidents - Nixon, Ford, Carter and Rea-
gan - have proposed some kind of decentralization as a way of controlling
the federal budget, the most comprehensive proposals coming from Presi-
dents Nixon and Reagan. For a scholarly commentary reflecting the appeal
of decentralization as a budgetary tool, see INSTITUTE OF CONTEMPORARY
STUDIES, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR THE REPUBLIC
(1982) and especially the article therein by Albert J. Davis, "Fiscal Effects
of the New Federalism."
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that the current deficits have not been created surreptitiously
or via "back door" spending. 8 The most expensive pro-
grams, Medicare and Social Security, are high priority pro-
grams created with extensive scrutiny and debate. These pro-
grams are continued openly, which is to say "politically,"
despite the huge expense they entail. This nation remains
steadfast in its commitment to these essential parts of a de-
cent, humane or liberal democracy and, as such, will not jetti-
son them merely because they have become expensive.
The current debate between the liberals and conserva-
tives reflects the political character of the current deficits.
Both liberals and conservatives trade charges of "fiscal irre-
sponsibility," but it is not too difficult to see that neither per-
suasion is willing to sacrifice what it deems essential to the
nation's welfare or security for the sake of a balanced budget.
The charge of "fiscal irresponsibility" often serves to mask
the real issue dividing liberals and conservatives: For what
purposes should the nation go into debt? "Fiscal irresponsibil-
ity" means spending money unnecessarily, but determining
what is "necessary" is to a large extent a political question.2
The nation will have to make certain difficult political de-
cisions before it can hope to solve its current budgetary
problems. However extensive or novel they might be, institu-
tional changes cannot of themselves solve the deficit problem.
Consider the fate of the Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974,80 which virtually everyone recognized as a re-
markable adaptation of previous congressional practices. The
Act established a procedure to allow Congress to determine
the priorities of the nation and to encourage Congress to ex-
ercise fiscal restraint through centralization of authority in
budget committees. 1 Fiscal restraint did not follow from this
Act, leading most commentators to argue that Congress is
28. HOUSE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 98TH CONG., 2d Sess., THE LINE-
ITEM VETo: AN APPRAISAL (1984). See also, Ornstein, supra note 22.
29. The size and shape of the budget is a matter of serious con-
tention in our political life. Presidents, political parties, adminis-
trators, Congressmen, interest groups, and interested citizens vie
with each other to have their preferences recorded in the budget.
The victories and defeats, the compromises and bargains, the
realms of agreement and spheres of conflict in regard to the role
of the national government in our society all appear in the budget.
In the most integral sense the budget lies at the heart of the politi-
cal process.
A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 18 at 4-5.
30. 2 U.S.C. §681 (1982).
31. See D. IPPOLITO, supra note 26, at 34.
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congenitally unable to control spending and, therefore, una-
ble to control the budget.3 2
It could well be that the Budget Act failed, however, be-
cause it tried to solve institutionally what can only be solved
politically. The 1974 Act failed, or fiscal restraint failed to
materialize under that Act, because it was based on the as-
sumption that congressional fiscal extravagance is more an in-
stitutional than a political phenomenon. 3 Centralized control
by itself cannot solve the current deficit crisis, whether that
control be centralized in Congress or the White House. The
proposed line item veto suffers from the same misdisrection
as the 1974 Budget Act: it attempts to do institutionally what
is best done politically. From this perspective, a line item veto
alone can do very little to advance the cause of a balanced
budget. Fiscal responsibility will follow from political choices,
not from making institutional adaptations.
Americans have a peculiar propensity toward, and even
an admirable capacity for, institutional change. When a prob-
lem arises, we tend to want to solve it institutionally. One re-
sponse to the Vietnam War was the War Powers Act which
attempted to clarify or to change the relationship between
the President and Congress with regard to the use of force
overseas.34 Its supporters hoped this legislation would pre-
vent a recurrence of what was deemed an unnecessary and/
or unwise military involvement in a foreign country.35 As
noted above, the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974 was part of an attempt to clarify or to redefine the rela-
tionship between the President and Congress and to retrofit
Congress' own budget process to solve fiscal problems." Most
recently, a line item veto amendment has been touted as the
latest institutional change which will help solve the nation's
fiscal or deficit problem. 7 If, however, the deficit problem is
a political phenomenon, then a line item veto, or any other
institutional reform itself, will not go very far at all toward
solving the problem of fiscal irresponsibility. Insofar as there
is a solution, it lies more in political change than in institu-
tional change. For the larger practical purposes, a line item
veto amendment is irrelevant.
32. Among numerous studies, one of the best is D. IPPOLITO, supra
note 26.
33. L. FISHER, THE CONSTITUTION BETWEEN FRIENDS 92 (1978).
34. 50 U.S.C. §1541 (1976).
35. Id.
36. 50 U.S.C. §1541, supra note 34.
37. Wall St. J., supra note 5.
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III
The argument sketched above does not completely settle
the dispute over the proposed line item veto amendment, be-
cause one might argue that whatever the general shortcom-
ings of an item veto,.it would be a useful tool to give to the
President for the sake of budgetary restraint. Although not
at the heart of the budgetary problem, the phenomenon de-
scribed by President Reagan is real. The President must ei-
ther veto an entire bill to nullify some objectionable items, or
sign the measure and contribute to the apparently ever-in-
creasing deficit.3 8 An item veto, while not sufficient by itself
to guarantee fiscal responsibility, would be a noticeable im-
provement in the federal budgetary process.3 9
The strength of this argument is that it recognizes the
major limitation of a line item veto, that it is in itself insuffi-
cient to meet the problem of "fiscal irresponsibility." Its
weakness is that it fails to take into account some of the unde-
sirable side-effects of such a veto power and fails to appreci-
ate the existence of the impoundment power, a more promis-
ing alternative under the original constitutional distribution
of power. 40
First, regarding the side-effects of such a reform, it is not
at all clear that granting the President a line item veto would
encourage congressional responsibility or fiscal restraint.
Under the existing constitutional arrangement, both Con-
gress and the President must consider the implications of at-
tempts to "pack" appropriations legislation with programs or
projects of marginal importance.4' The President can and
does make clear his objections to proposed legislation, often
even indicating his intention to veto legislation which does
not meet his expectations in detail."2 And, contrary to com-
mon opinion, such a promise is carried out with some regu-
larity by the President despite the costs involved.4' With a
line item veto Congress could act even more irresponsibly
than it does at present, packing appropriations bills with
questionable items, forcing the President to cut or reduce
particular items as he sees fit. Then a congressman could tell
38. See Reagan, supra note 1.
39. See especially Palffy, supra note 2.
40. See L. FISHER, supra note 33.
41. One objectionable provision can delay passage of the entire bill.
42. L. FISHER, supra note 33, at 90.
43. President Reagan, for example, exercised his veto power 40
times, as of April 13, 1985.
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his constituents that he had promoted a certain project, only
to have it vetoed by the President. Indirectly or unintention-
ally, then, a line item veto might serve to increase rather
than decrease the potential for congressional irresponsibility.
Second, a line item veto has significant implications for
the balance of power between the President and Congress.""
In the typical scenario for use of the item veto, the President
reacts to clearly unessential appropriations, but it is not diffi-
cult to imagine a President using his new veto power in an
"offensive" rather than "defensive" manner. That is, a Presi-
dent would be far more able to bring "recalcitrant" congress-
men into line by threatening to veto certain appropriations of
particular interest to them and their constituents. With a line
item veto presidential government, meaning the clear pre-
dominance of the President in determining policy, might be-
come a reality with constitutional underpinnings.
This possibility has been recognized by some of the line
item veto's supporters. For example, one of the most puz-
zling aspects of Senator Alan Dixon's constitutional amend-
ment is that it would allow a simple majority of either house
of Congress to override the President's item veto."' This pro-
vision is puzzling, because if the crux of the problem is con-
gressional fiscal irresponsibility, it is difficult to understand
how such a veto would check Congress. Senator Dixon argues
that his proposal is "well-balanced" in this regard: "It will
help restrain spending without upsetting the careful set of
checks and balances among the three branches now con-
tained in our Constitution.""' Perhaps Senator Dixon's
description is correct, but if so then balance is the fatal flaw
of his proposed amendment. As President Ford discovered
when acting under the impoundment provisions of the 1974
Budget Act, Congress will not tolerate fiscal discipline, espe-
cially when only a simple majority is needed to avoid it.47 It is
the requirement of an extraordinary majority that gives the
President's veto power meaning, that makes it more than
"advisory." A line item veto as proposed by Senator Dixon is
merely advisory.
44. Hearings, supra note 3, at 5.
45. 129 CONG. REC. S836-7 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1983) (statement of Sen.
Dixon).
46. Id. at S837.
47. D. IPPOLITO, supra note 26, at 154.
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IV
This brings to the fore the final issue to be considered
here, that of impoundment.48 An item veto is unnecessary,
because under the original distribution of power made by the
Constitution the President may legitimately impound funds.49
This practice is preferable to an item veto. There are good
reasons for thinking that this practice is arguably
constitutional."
The starting point is to recognize that while the separa-
tion of powers in the Constitution is intended to achieve a
balanced government, this balance is tilted in favor of an in-
dependent executive. 51 Independence requires both separate-
ness (a separate mode of election, for example 52) and broad
powers derived from the Constitution rather than from the
legislature .5 An independent executive is by and large indis-
tinguishable from a powerful executive, one able to act uni-
laterally for the public good. This concept some of the Fram-
ers of the Constitution strove, successfully I think, to embed
in that document."
An independent or powerful executive does not mean an
all-powerful executive, one which was intended to displace
the legislature and assume its prerogatives. The Framers
were keenly aware of the strengths as well as the limitations
of legislative bodies. They were aware of what legislatures
could do well (deliberate),5 5 of what they could not do well
(promote and maintain unity),5' and of what they could not
do at all (act with secrecy and dispatch). 57 While the Presi-
dent's powers are broad, they are best understood as in-
tended not so much to displace as to supplement the legisla-
48. Louis Fisher describes four types of impoundment in L. FISHER,
PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 148 (1975).
49. For a contrary view of how Congress controls spending, and
therefore, budget policy, see D. IPPOLITO, supra note 26 at 37.
50. I don't intend this argument to be a definitive defense of the con-
stitutionality of impoundment, but merely to indicate a few factors which
suggest its validity.
51. The best secondary source supporting this argument is C. THACH,
THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775-1789 (1969) and the introduction
by Herbert J. Storing. The best primary source remains THE FEDERALIST
Nos. 69-77 (A. Hamilton).
52. U.S. CONST. art. II, §1.
53. See generally, U.S. CONST. art. II.
54. Id. at 52.
55. The Federalist Papers, Nos. 10, 60-64.
56. Id., Nos. 10, 51, 67, 68.
57. Id., Nos. 67, 70.
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tive powers." Hence, it is permissible to speak of a
government under the Constitution as one of broad and com-
prehensive powers.
The argument is that the Constitution grants the Presi-
dent broad powers meant to supplement those granted the
legislature in a way that makes those powers whole or com-
plete.59 It is commonly granted that Congress appropriates
and the executive spends. Interpreting this distribution of
power in light of the above, it may be argued that the spend-
ing power should be deemed to be subject to the presidential
power to impound or refusal to spend. Hence, impoundment
is arguably one of the President's implied powers.60
Assuming that it is constitutional, why is impoundment
superior to an item veto? First, because the department most
in need of restraint cannot easily override the President's de-
cision not to spend." In fact, constitutionally speaking, Con-
gress has little recourse when the President impounds.6 " Po-
litically speaking, however, the relationship is different. In
the political arena, Congress has the power to affect the Pres-
ident's decisions and the public's perceptions of those deci-
sions. If the first part of this essay is correct - that budget
battles are political battles - then the political arena is pre-
58. One example must suffice here. The Congress' powers regarding
foreign affairs are "literary" or "declarative," while the president's powers
are "demonstrative." Congress is given the power to declare war and to
grant letters of marque and reprisal. The president, on the other hand, com-
mands the nation's armed forces, i.e., makes war, and also makes treaties
supported by the Senate. This distribution of power reflects the Framers'
conviction that while legislative bodies are best at deliberating, executives
and especially unitary executives are best at acting. Hence, when the nation
finds it necessary to act, the president is its foremost officer. Preferably,
action should be taken with or preceded by deliberation, but this is not
always possible.
59. See U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, art. I, §7.
60. President Ford used impoundments regularly in his battle with
Congress. D. IPPOLITO, supra note 26, at 153-57.
61. Before the passage of the Budget and. Impoundment Control Act,
Congress found it very difficult to check the President when he impounded
funds. In fact, President Nixon's use of the impoundment power, which
most agree was very ambitious, was virtually unchecked by Congress alone.
It was only with the aid of the courts that Congress was able to check
Nixon. Cf., Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975).
62. This fact has been reinforced by the Supreme Court's decision
and opinion in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 103
S.Ct. 2764 (1983). It would appear that this decision renders the impound-
ment control provisions of the Budget Act of 1974 unconstitutional. Of
course, this does not mean that Congress is without any constitutional
means of controlling impoundments.
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cisely where the issue should be decided.
Second, impoundment is superior to an item veto be-
cause its limitations are "built in." Impoundment is not ex-
plicitly granted to the President by the Constitution. How-
ever sound the impoundment power is, it is a power that rests
on inference and implication.63 Further, impoundment
smacks of prerogative or the power to defy the law, and,
therefore, it should be used sparingly by presidents, perhaps
only when its use is deemed essential to advance the public
interest.64 As Hamilton points out in the The Federalist Pa-
pers, a qualified veto will be used more readily than an abso-
lute one, because the latter offends the sensibilities of repub-
lican citizens.6" Impoundment, then, is at once more effectual
than an item veto and less likely to be abused by the
president.
V
Impoundment is not endorsed here because it is thought
that such a power would be sufficient in itself to achieve what
is being called today "fiscal responsibility" or a balanced
budget. As suggested, impoundment should be used selec-
tively to stop only the most flagrant instances of fiscal irre-
sponsibility. If this argument is taken to imply that the Con-
stitution and its distribution of power cannot ensure "fiscal
responsibility," so be it. The point is that no constitution or
constitutional distribution of power is in itself sufficient to
such a purpose. This alleged "incapacity" is not a constitu-
tional defect, because a constitution, especially the American
Constitution, is meant to structure not supplant politics. Or,
put differently, whatever the virtues of constitutional govern-
ment, such government was not intended and should not be
understood to render self-government unnecessary.
63. See generally, L. FISHER, supra note 33. For the Supreme Court's
"response," see Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975).
64. G. EDWARDS, PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE IN CONGRESS 20 (1980).
65. THE FEDERALIST, No. 73, at 444 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961).
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